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Abstract
Liberals and libertarians believe that justice is deeply embodied in liberalism. The
famous physiocratic maxim "let them do business, let people and goods move: the
world works by itself" relegated to second place some virtues such as justice and
equity by considering them as mechanical outputs produced by market mechanisms.
The invisible hand of Adam Smith is so benevolent that it inherently puries var-
ious actions of the market. However, reality does not often look forward to these
considerations often qualied as ideal. The market is not fair and Pareto optimality
is still running even if an individual walks away from the rich to the detriment of
another. A rereading of justice by Rawls empowered liberalism to return to normal-
ity long sought and rarely approved. However, at the level of political governance,
justice is far from being installed whenever democracy casts away almost all indi-
viduals (people) and supports a few to govern. This latter, hypothetically unable
to personify and care for individuals, is forced to crush individual preferences by
directing them to an unknown preference qualied as the peoples preference. The
aim of this paper is to study this issue by emphasizing the obligation of reviewing
democracy so that it serves best the values of liberalism and justice.
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Introduction
Nowadays, it is commonly accepted that the issue of justice has become a
corner stone in all philosophical, political, sociological and economic thinking.
The importance given to justice is not new; it is as old as history itself. All
divine religions (Christianity and Islam) did not weary to make justice a piv-
otal subject as it is considered a virtue and an unquestionable value. Along
these lines, philosophers have tried to examine this issue in order to give it
more explicit objective and scientic dimensions. Nevertheless, we notice that
human thinking on justice is very well attached to human existence. A theory
of justice is a new venue. Indeed, we can fairly claim that only with the emer-
gence of the coherent political theory of liberalismdid justice take such a
scale and importance in human thinking.
Then, as early as the 17th century, liberalism as a concept would become the
focus of those intellectuals who had been seeking a model of a new society.
This latter should shake if not ruin previous structures to make room for a
free society. Consequently, in its turn justice has to take its position in this
society driven by liberalism, as it is an inherent value of liberalism. Never-
theless, this transition has often been taken in very simplistic and implicit
tones which often hindered resolution of problem of justice or, at least, did
not succeed in answering the following question: What is justice? This ill-made
conceptualisation generated, additionally, judgments of value more than scien-
tic assessments. Moreover, this book has given men of science (philosophers,
sociologists and economists) theoretical and analytical means to both reread
history and theorize about the concept of "fair society."
However, if justice starts to be felt in various socio-economic areas, it is far
from being materialized in the political eld, which remains governed by mo-
nopolising groups while excluding the individual. Democracy remains hitherto
dependent on its etymological meaning, which calls for governance of the peo-
ple (without seeing people govern or even have the opportunity to rally any
other collective action). Liberalism that defends the individual did not, polit-
ically, bring about individual governance; rather it installed governance of the
group. A priori, we conrm that there is a contradiction between the concepts
of liberalism and democracy, because the rst is a value, while the second is
a means and an arbitration tool. The problem is that the tool has never been
forced on value: it has little interest in making formal governance of an indi-
vidual or a group of individuals (by the name of the people) a real governance
and this can be done by enabling individual governance. The goal is to change
the meaning of democracy so that it will not be the governance of the majority
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but of all individuals in a society. The question to be asked in this regard is:
why have not formal democracies invested in this meaning? We understand
and accept that democracies operate at an absolute or relative majority in
poor countries that can not a¤ord to create institutions capable of involving
people in governance. However, in rich and developed countries advocating
liberalism and individualism as irreversible values, we nd it hard to under-
stand this reluctance and especially the noticeable decision to eliminate the
individual from the sphere of decision making. Is the individual inherently less
intelligent than the politician? If the answer is yes, then why is his/her voice
sought during elections? In addition, if the State believes itself to be superior
to individuals, then why does it take a lot of wrong decisions which may be
ruinous in the present and the future (environmental degradation, pollution,
wars, and crises).
It is in those terms that our paper presents itself and tries to detect the
relationship between three key concepts; democracy, liberalism and justice.
Then, in order to conduct well our analysis, we will check in a second section
whether the relationship between justice and liberalism is conciliation-driven
or conict-driven? The third section will examine how the current democracy
concept is dealing with current economic crises. The last section examines the
relationship between democracy and governance of justice (to govern or be
governed).
1 Justice versus liberalism: conciliation or conict?
Liberalism is a philosophical, political and economic concept advocating re-
spect of individual liberties in all circumstances. Thus, taken from the side
of political freedom we can say that liberalism has been able to provide, at
least partially, one of the principles of justice like Rawls fairness (the rst
principle). However, did economic liberalism insure this justice? The answer
is a priori negative as a detailed examination of pure and simple economic
liberalism easily reveals that the issue of justice was often relegated to second
place. This is not surprising given that liberal physiocratic schools, classical
and neoclassical, wanted to reconciliate between economics and physics. This
reconciliation advocated naturalism of economics that will lead, therefore, to
natural and universal economic laws. Such laws are benevolent and providen-
tial. Physiocrats (essentially Quesnay) claim that there is a natural order by
which companies and individuals should abide. This natural order itself pro-
vides the organization of production and distribution. This latter is natural:
wage (w) is equal to the minimum needs, the rent (R) depends on fertility of
cultivated land and prot (P) is simply a residual term (P = Y-W-R). Thus,
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we see that the distribution of wealth according to this logic can only be fair
because it comes from a natural distribution. Hence the rst note:
* Note (1): Fair distribution is the one that comes from the natural operation
of the market (economic laws are natural).
Physiocratic economy, advocating absolute freedom of individuals while look-
ing for their own interests and subscribing to methodological individualism,
has made the issue of justice less important since it is attached to the sim-
ple vagaries of nature. Their maxim "Let business roll, let people and goods
move around; the world works by itself" compacts and conrms the above
mentioned ideas. In fact, this slogan is a message to the government to refrain
from any interference in the economic eld, in this case, the distribution of
wealth. It is nature which determines the allocation and distribution of goods
and wealth. Worse, state intervention will destabilize the system and distort
market mechanisms.
Freedoms () individual interests () collective interests () justice
Along these lines, classic philosophy found its roots where the same physio-
cratic thinking persists. A. Smith advocated in his own terms liberalism as an
irrevocable and irreversible value that each individual and society seeks. Free
actions from each individual allow reaching some level of harmony between
individual interests, on the one hand, and collective interests, on the other.
In this regard, Smith wrote that the total sum of the annual produce of land
and labour of a country is naturally divided into three components : rent of
land, wages of labour and prots of stocks. He shows that the interest of the
rst of these big categories is tightly and inseparably linked to the general
interest of the society. All that benets or damages one of these interests
necessarily a¤ects the other 2 .
Adams enthusiasm for politico-economic liberalism and for the market is
mainly due to its supremacy as an allocation and a distribution mechanism
that might guide the economy towards optimal situations. His hostility to the
State is explained by the fact that its intervention risks to limit individual
liberties and prevent the invisible hand from achieving harmony between in-
dividual and collective interests. This interventionism is more harmful than
useful. Harmful because it might distort maximisation programmes installed
by individuals and useless because it might add nothing to a system already
perfectand fair. Hence, our second note:
Note 2: what will the expected opportunity behind studying justice be? Al-
2 A. Smith (1976) « La recherche sur la nature et les causes de la richesse des
nations» éds Guillaumin Paris ; réédition de 1843 (première édition en 1776) .
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ready, and according to a classic view, this issue is superuous because nature
can only be fair (the basic hypothesis of classical philosophy).
However, the continuous and permanent evolution of the real sphere generated
some progress in politico-economic thinking which often questioned the merits
of liberalism as well as classic distributive justice issued from free functioning
of market mechanisms. As an illustration, without being necessarily exclusive,
we can mention the contribution of the historical German school (Wagner
and F. List), the protectionist school (J. Stuart Mill), the socialist anarchist
school (Proudhon, Bakounine, Kropotkine) and the socialist scientic school
(K. Marx and F. Engels, Lenin, Stalin), which criticised economic liberalism
on its two founding principles. First, economic laws are neither absolute nor
universal. They are rather variable and relative which questions naturalism
of the economy and consequently makes the task of looking for distributive
justice more requested and more complicated. Second, the market is no longer
a conservative and a neutral mechanism; it is often a venue where injustice
is created, which harms both contracting parties (consumer and producer).
In other words, the market blindly transforms the power relationship which
binds o¤er and demand and sets an equilibrium price which often deviates
from the real price (it cannot cover the average cost incurred by the producer
or it prevents the consumer from either accessing or fully enjoying the price
because of scarcity of resources).
The above-mentioned schools, although they criticized liberalism on both its
philosophical-political and economic dimensions, did not give much attention
to the issue of justice. The latter often remains an implicit and a simple
macro-social conception resulting from human conict, either at the politi-
cal or economic levels. However, from the advent of the 19th century a new
philosophy will give momentum to the issue of justice. The merit of this phi-
losophy does not lie in its theoretical contribution but in the criticism that it
will receive later. Finally, a theory of justice is born. This philosophy is the
utilitarianism whose origins went up to D. Hume. However, J. Bentham gave
it more depth and much rigor. G. Boss [1990] argues that Bentham consider
"the principles of action all relate usefully to pleasure and pain, which are
the real springs of all our actions .... Under these conditions, not only are we
naturally determined by pleasure and pain, but we could have no other duty
than to follow their impulses 3 ". Bentham dened utility as follows: "By the
principle of utility, I mean that principle which approves or disapproves every
action whatsoever, according to the trend it seems to have, either increasing
or diminishing happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, equally
well, to promote happiness or to oppose it 4 .
3 For more details see Gilbert B. (1990) « John Stuart Mill : Induction et Utilité
» Eds PUF, p24.
4 Ibidem p25.
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1.1 Post utilitarianism (the Pareto criterion)
Early twentieth century, Vilfredo Pareto, in his "Manual of Political Econ-
omy", showed that the assumption of ordinal utility is su¢ cient to establish
the demand curve. In addition, he tried to renew utilitarianism. He considers
that utility is the satisfaction that an individual gains in a given situation.
This satisfaction translates into a preference scale. The introduction of prefer-
ences will make the hedonistic connotation conferred by Bentham to secondary
individual actions. In other words, if the individual prefers S1 to S2 then two
cases are possible. First, it is possible that S1 provides more satisfaction than
S2. Second, it is possible that S1 is preferred since it has the character of
duty (take the example of an activist who sacriced his life for others). In his
"Treatise on General Sociology" [1916], he insists on an optimality criterion
known by his name "Pareto" and states that Ais optimal if it can increase
the utility of a subset of individuals without damaging that of another (no
matter how small).
This criterion equally contributed to both normative philosophy and positive
economics. Of course, while confronting this criterion, the Benthamian utili-
tarianism will be blocked because the principle of maximizing social utility can
not operate in the presence of the constraint of xed utility. This rereading of
utilitarianism does not save it because the Pareto criterion remains, despite
its originality, silent on distributive justice.
Note (3): The Pareto criterion has crossed the utilitarian sacrice problem but
did not solve the problem of distributive justice.
Rawls analysis of Justice goes beyond utilitarianism and Pareto analysis of
justice, determining the principles necessary to establish "justice as fairness".
These principles will allow to break with socialism (as Rawls does not opt for
egalitarianism) while defending liberalism. This is supposed to be the ideal
shelter of justice. The rst principle requires us to place ourselves into political
and economic liberalism. Equal opportunities can provide individuals the same
opportunities and advantages that enable them to act. The di¤erence principle
(or Maxim) admits inequality of liberalism but assumes the said inequality
should benet the most disadvantaged categories.
Therefore, Rawls liberalism seems to be subject to moral principles in as much
as the mentioned principles do not reduce the basic freedoms that are already
guaranteed by the rst principle. Primary goods resolve the distribution prob-
lem to which Pareto failed to nd an answer as he judges goods to be provided
to individuals according to the unanimity criterion. Rawls writes, "But the pri-
mary goods, as I have already observed, are all what a rational being would
desire, whatever his other desires are .... Overall, we can say that primary
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social goods consist of rights, liberties and o¤ered opportunities, incomes and
wealth" 5
1.2 Justice and liberalism after Rawls
After the publication of the work of Rawls, it has been subject to several dif-
ferent criticisms by many philosophers and economists. A. Sen [1987] opposed
Rawls accusing him of being interested only in means and not in the capacity
of individuals to enjoy these means. Indeed, for Sen, liberalism is not simply
letting people enjoy the freedoms o¤ered to them as this permission and au-
thorization do not mechanically translate into actual consumption. Freedom
is a value, the value is a good and a good is consumable only by those who
are able to consume.
Henceforth, it is not enough that an individual has the means in order to reach
a given objective. In this context, Sen wrote "It is important to distinguish
capability, i.e. the freedom actually enjoyed by an individual from primary
goods (and other resources), on the one hand and on the other hand the life
really chosen and other achieved results" 6 . Sen assumes that an individual
with any disability is unable to achieve neither his objectives nor a life project.
He noted that "a person with a disability may have a higher amount of pri-
mary goods but with a capacity lower than that of another person (due to
disability)" 7 . According to Sen, real freedom and then justice lie in what the
individual is able to do and achieve.
The position of F.V. Hayek on justice is in real terms a return or a fall-back
to classic orthodoxy which advocates free market as the mechanism allowing
for reaching economic e¢ ciency and normative values. According to him, the
justice problem in a free economy is superuous. In his second volume of
his book Law, Legislation and liberty (1973), V. hayek insists on the fact
that the term social justice is meaningless in a liberal society. He further
argues that in an economymanaged by market mechanisms, states and reached
decisions cannot be qualied neither fair nor unfair because the market is
a neutral conservative mechanism. However, in economies with centralised
planning, justice and injustice may take place as the States action may favour
some groups at the expense of others. Hayek notes that in a market economy,
the fair and the unfair are not results proper to the market but rather the
way competition is practised. This extremism pushes Hayek to reject any type
5 J. Rawls (1987). "La théorie de la justice" Eds SEUIL pp122-123. Translation
down by authors paper
6 Amartya. S (1987) « Ethique et économie» Eds PUF Paris p220. Translation
down by authors paper
7 A. Sen op.cit p220. Translation down by authors paper
7
of equal opportunities as he considers it dangerous in as much as it may
negatively inuence environment of individuals.
2 Formal democracys inability to face current economic crises
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama wrote in his book
"The End of History and the Last Man" [1992] 8 that the world has seen the
end of "mankinds ideological evolution and the universalization of Western
liberal democracy as the nal form of human governance. Citing Hegel, the
author declares that the desire for mutual recognition between human be-
ings, which for him is Thymos Platonist, is the driving force behind history.
Based on this dialectical vision, Fukuyama says that history is moving to-
wards liberal democracy as its the nal step. In support of his thesis, which
coincided with the collapse of both the former socialist countries block and al-
most the unanimous convergence towards a democratic globalization (at least
formally), many countries in southern and eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and
Latin America have held multiparty elections for the rst time during the past
two decades.
However, these experiences of democratization and democratic institutions
are facing more and more political riots and economic crises that may o¤set
their legitimacy grounds. Length and relative intensities of the global economic
downturn further worsened di¢ culties and doubted the viability of these insti-
tutions 9 . This conrms the possibility and even the obligation to consider re-
searching new models and strategies to promote political stability and sustain
growth. But above all, we should rethink about distribution and redistribution
strategies so that justice as fairness is a criterion of irreversible political and
economic choice.
Challenges facing democratic institutions, including economic imbalances, pub-
lic dissent and historic instability extend beyond these. In Western democra-
cies, governments are struggling to maintain social protection programs while
adopting austerity measures to ght against high decits. The di¢ culty of
the European Union to reduce the e¤ects of debt crises of the Member States
has cast doubt on the e¤ectiveness of an institution designed to preserve Eu-
ropean unity. Even in the largest democratic state in the world, India, the
government is struggling to appease widespread public dissent during decades
8 Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man.The Free Press.
9 Issaoui Fakhri « Le Management de Développement en Afrique (Agir sur les
capabilités) » ; Global Journal of Management and Business research (GJMBR)
Volume 11 Issue 1 Version 1.0 ; Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA).
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of corruption. The Pakistani model, moving towards a democratic transition,
su¤ers from a very unstable and even a turbulent political market mainly
with a fragile economic base. For long, this new-born democracy has been
occasionally delayed or stopped by military coups.
Elsewhere in Third World countries, the democratization process faces very
often a decline which nourishes stiing of freedoms. In Africa, and after dis-
mantling the abject one-party rule, this state-of-a¤airs is clearly consolidated
in some countries that have proclaimed democracy and which were between
the hammer and the anvil as they had faced chronic internal economic di¢ cul-
ties and constant external interference. Also, some countries in Latin America,
by tracing their path to democracy after decades of dictatorship or communist
military rule, have faced the same problems. This makes any process of democ-
ratization in these countries a di¢ cult task. Thus, one can ask a fundamental
question about the universalization of democracy. It goes without saying that
any universal system is fundamentally based on common ideas and principles.
Parallel to the injustice done to the interior of a nation, liberal democracies are
engaged as well in international injustices. We should also remember that when
the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou wanted to consult his people
through a referendum, he has been severely criticized since this procedure
could be a disastrous deviation compared to the ultimate objective which
is to rescue Greece from its deep economic crisis. Thus, in the nal analysis,
democracy is the lack of established values. In addition, linking liberalism with
democracy is oppressive because it is provided by a massive individualism and
the triumph of human rights. However, these two components do not go hand
in hand and we often note bumping the second by the rst, which can be seen
as a smooth destruction of democracy. It is therefore clear that democracy is
not idyllic. In this regard, Winston Churchill once said that "No one pretends
that democracy is perfect or wise. It happened to me to hear that this is the
worst of governments, except all the others that have been experienced in
history. "
Many observers, in search of inspiration, turned to China, which has emerged
relatively unscathed from the recession, thanks to centralized recovery pro-
grams. While China streamlines an autocratic approach which may remove
some bureaucracies and a­ icting democratic institutions, it pursued an eco-
nomic development that may require and produce a gradual democratization
of the governance structure. However, solutions to a democratic model, already
in di¢ culty, using another autocratic model, contradict the basic principles
of democracy of which, and not exclusive, peoples sovereignty and freedom.
The recourse to such model is justied by the fact that changes in regulation
did not mitigate the social cost of change. This is why the requirements for
strengthening democratic institutions are thematically similar, since they con-
tributed nothing to the social dimension. In as much as we do not nd a real
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compromise between the individual and social needs, intangibility of liberal
democracy remains problematic.
3 Democracy and justice governance (rule or be ruled)
Democracy su¤ers and risks not reaching the goals it has set for itself or what
individuals assume ex ante that it could achieve for itself ex post. Beyond this
lies an idea often mentioned but rarely materialized. Democracy correlates less
with law, though some argue the opposite. In fact, the mentioned democracy
does not often lead to economic democratization, simply because it politically
created a State and parliaments unrepresentative of individuals. Indeed, the
State completely ignores individual preferences as it has, in our view, no way
to detect them. It can inform itself about individuals, know about their com-
munities, their economic situations and all other information vectors, but not
their preferences which remain ultimately private personal information. Po-
litical parties assume ex ante collective programs and preferences and really
look for individuals and groups of individuals endorsing those programs and
preferences. This nally leads to strange governance that relegates individuals
and makes them dependent on godfather-like politicians.
This latter does nothing but assume those preferences to hesitantly defend
later. It is di¢ cult for the godfather politician to associate electorsinterests
and make them converge towards a unied social interest. Once in power,
elected politicians start to act consistently with the interests of their parties
and their own interests. Social interest, assumed to be public, turns out to be
a myth once it does not often overlap with the politicians individual interest
which is introvert and purely ego-centred. If the public benets from a political
action, then this supposes that the politicians ego is socially expressed as a
collective preference. The politicians individual interest is known for him and
comes before that of the group given the fact that the electors interest is
invisible and thus likely to be disregarded.
Likewise, we draw attention to another problem in liberal democracies where
we witness political bargaining that often ends in supporting the unwished-for
and unrequested objectives by individuals (the second Gulf War is illustrative
yet not exclusive). The problem is that State governance su¤ers from lack of
information that cannot allow it to know about individual preferences. Such
lack of information pushes the State to make decisions on the basis of authentic
information (its own interest) and imaginary information (social interest). This
latter is possible given that a given individual, not considered in the collective
preference, may assume that the other individuals are considered.
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Where liberalism is advocated, the individual does not govern but delegates
the group to do it. Is this a good governance system? The answer a priori
is negative because a fair system should reach a real justice, and not just a
formal one, by involving individuals in such governance, whatever minimum
it is. Delegating preferences is meaningless because the politician has his own
preferences which may often oppose those of the electors. Likewise, it would
be di¢ cult to conceive a parliament consisting of all individual citizens of a
given nation. Then, what should be done?
In our opinion it would be interesting to think in terms of the so-called "trans-
mission of preferences." Thus, instead of having a politician display a program
and look for voters (classic pattern), individuals reveal their preferences and
transmit them to relevant institutions. This may start, for example, in a given
neighbourhood where people reveal their choices and expectations and quan-
tify their needs and requests. The group chooses a sub-group to transmit their
preferences to a higher level (the city). At this level, negotiations will take place
(among other representatives of other districts) and lead to enriched prefer-
ences and relatively more exhaustive. Again, we should choose a sub-group to
transmit the new preferences (of the city) to a higher level (the nation).
At the national level, we will be dealing with real preferences reecting the
true signals originally made by individuals. However, can we have situations
where representatives of a group deviate from their mission and start seeking
their own interests? The answer is still negative for two reasons. First, they are
individuals who are transmitters of preferences, not delegates. Second, they
do not have privileges and benets they can defend during negotiations. In
addition, they are not politicians with political agendas, but ordinary citizens
whose roles are to convey and defend individual preferences initially set.
The individual is probably the best placed to manage and protect his own
interests. Moreover, he is better placed and informed than the state to govern
his surroundings (neighbourhoods, schools, colleges). Collective preferences
(issued from the preferences of di¤erent groups) may be more e¤ective than
those determined by politicians because they reveal only those preferences
which are benecial for them. Municipalities may opt for this way of thinking
which help save them from conducting unsolicited interventions (service o¤er-
ing) and rationalize their actions by making them converge towards the most
appropriate ones.
Such governance allows individuals to contribute actively in decision-making
and allows the economy to tighten and diminish freedom granted to politi-
cians. This is socially benecial because it reduces the interests sought by
those politicians whose roles are reduced to realizing preferences revealed in-
dividually. The e¤ectiveness of state intervention would improve because the
individual is often more informed than municipalities, relevant ministries and
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other political organizations at both the quick detection of problems and iden-
tication of defaults.
A rst step should be undertaken to make democracy more concrete and true
to its fundamental theme, the "individual". This should be able to break with
the classic image where individuals delegate politicians. In fairness terms, the
free individual should genuinely enjoy freedom granted to him and this can
be done only when he governs or actually participates in governance. Social
choice determined ex post, and although it may be against some individual
preferences, is certainly democratic because it involves individual choices made
by the majority. However, classic majority is virtual because it is a relative
statistical (simple ratio) and political (the party that had the most votes)
majority.
4 Conclusion
Justice is an irreversible value that should be individually consumed. How-
ever, democracy does not lead to fair governance where all individuals can
actively participate in the decisions that a¤ect them. Political elitism, while
promoting interest groups and excluding the mass, does not lead to e¤ective
decision-making which should lead us to deeply reinterpret current democra-
cies. In contexts where liberalism is a value, democracy should be liberal, i.e.
individual-focused, allowing the individual to reveal his choices while ensuring
that these choices are faithfully transmitted to higher levels.
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